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ARTIFICIAL WISDOM? A POTENTIAL LIMIT
ON AI IN LAW (AND ELSEWHERE)
JOSHUA P. DAVIS*
Abstract
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) may soon perform all tasks that belong to the
factual realm more effectively than can human beings. AI may become
superior—likely far superior—at describing, predicting, and persuading. Its
competitive advantage in these pursuits may well extend to legal and judicial
practice. Does that mean human participation in the law will be rendered
obsolete? Not necessarily. This Essay suggests three propositions may hold
true that would justify an ongoing—perhaps permanent—role for human
beings: (1) that moral judgment is necessary for legal and judicial practice;
(2) that the first-person perspective (or subjectivity) is necessary for moral
judgment; and (3) that AI is incapable of attaining the first-person
perspective. After briefly addressing the first two propositions, the Essay
focuses on the third. It explores ways in which the best scientific accounts of
various phenomena related to the first-person perspective—consciousness,
free will, and the unified self—seem incompatible with an internal experience
of the first-person perspective, particularly when it comes to decisionmaking. AI seems to be a creature of science, suggesting it too may be
incompatible with the first-person perspective. If so, while we must recognize
the staggering potential of artificial intelligence, there is no similar prospect
for artificial wisdom. The need for wisdom—understood here as involving
moral judgment—preserves a role for human beings in legal decisionmaking.
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) holds extraordinary potential. It has proven
superior to human beings in various ways. It plays chess better than we do.1
* Professor and Director, Center for Law and Ethics, University of San Francisco
School of Law. My thinking on these topics has benefited greatly from collaboration with
Brad Wendel. I also received valuable comments from Stephen Henderson and Melissa
Mortazavi. I am grateful for assistance in research on the topic from one of our excellent
research librarians, Suzanne Mawhinney, and from an excellent research assistant, Javkhlan
Enkhbayar.
1. See MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
51 (2017); Dana Mackenzie, Update: Why This Week’s Man-Versus-Machine Go Match
Doesn’t Matter (and What Does), SCI. MAG. (Mar. 15, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.
sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/update-why-week-s-man-versus-machine-go-match-doesn-tmatter-and-what-does (discussing the World Chess Champion’s loss to a computer in 1997).
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It plays Go better than we do.2 It will soon drive cars better than we do.3 In
the not too distant future, it may well be able to program computers better
than we can.4 When that occurs, many experts predict a rapid acceleration.5
AI will create enhanced AI, which will create even more enhanced AI, and a
recursive loop will follow. Through a process that will progress at an
exponential rate, the result will be artificial superintelligence (“ASI”).6
Neither the speed nor the limit of this process will be linear. ASI in rapid
succession will exceed the intelligence of any human being, then the
collective intelligence of all human beings, and then perhaps any level of
intelligence we can imagine. Enter the technological singularity. As we
contemplate this possibility—inevitability?—we must shift from asking what
AI can do to asking what, if anything, it cannot do.
This Essay proceeds from the assumption that ASI will master the world
of fact. It will build machines that can sense anything any current life form
can, and perhaps much that eludes the perceptions of life as we know it today.
ASI will also solve any scientific problem that we have the potential to solve.
Human beings will be forced to cede the realms of description and prediction.
Any enduring human participation in those efforts will be a pastime. Some
people now drive restored cars from the 1950s. Others collect manual
typewriters. But those hobbies do not contribute meaningfully to
2. World’s Best Go Player Flummoxed by Google’s ‘Godlike’ AlphaGo AI, GUARDIAN
(May 23, 2017, 6:29 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/23/alphagogoogle-ai-beats-ke-jie-china-go. The best Go player in the world, Ke Jie, thought he would
never lose to a computer. Id. His response: “I feel like his game is more and more like the ‘Go
god.’ Really, it is brilliant.” Id.
3. See, e.g., JERRY KAPLAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO
KNOW 41-42 (2016).
4. As John Searle once commented,
[A]s soon as someone says that there is a certain sort of task that computers
cannot do, the temptation is very strong to design a program that performs
precisely that task. And this has often happened. When it happens, the critics of
artificial intelligence usually say that the task was not all that important anyway
and the computer successes do not really count. The defenders of artificial
intelligence feel, with some justice, that the goal posts are being constantly
moved.
JOHN SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 63 (2004) [hereinafter SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF
INTRODUCTION].
5. See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 138-43; Irving John Good, Speculations
Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine, in ADVANCES IN COMPUTERS 31, 78 (Franz L.
Alt & Morris Rubinoff eds., 1965).
6. See, e.g., NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES (2014);
ROMAN V. YAMPOLSKIY, ARTIFICIAL SUPERINTELLIGENCE: A FUTURISTIC APPROACH (2015).
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technological advancement. All human participation in science will be a
hobby. If any of us understands the mechanics of what ASI achieves, it will
be because ASI uses its genius to provide dumbed-down explanations so that
the most brilliant among us can glimpse in simplistic form what none of us
can comprehend. Even they will be privileged spectators, not meaningful
participants.
The resulting risk is that the whole working world will follow taxi drivers
and truck drivers into the dustbin of obsolescence.7 ASI will diagnose
illnesses, prescribe medications, and perform surgeries far better than
doctors. It will design and assemble buildings far better than architects and
construction workers. And it will be able to describe the law, predict how
people will interpret and apply the law, and frame persuasive legal arguments
far better than judges and lawyers. Does that mean ASI will displace all legal
practitioners? Not necessarily.
Facts may not exhaust what exists in the world. There is also the realm of
value. While AI is capable of helping us pursue our ends, it is not clear that
AI can choose ultimate ends for us. The axes of fact and value may be
orthogonal—extending at a right angle from one another. As Hume long ago
suggested, it may not be possible to derive an “ought” from an “is.”8 If not,
then AI—and ASI—may not be able to make any progress along the axis of
value, no matter its extension along the axis of fact. Increasing zero by any
factor or exponent still leaves zero.
This Essay explores the possibility that ASI will not be able to conquer the
realm of value and that its inability to do so will circumscribe the role it can
play in law. The Essay does not offer a fully developed argument but rather
the beginnings of one. It starts with intuitions about the limits of AI (and
ASI). Two characteristics—likely related—mark AI. First, it appears to
operate purely in the realm of the scientific world. The knowledge it captures
is most consistent with a naturalized materialism—with a popular
understanding of science. Second, at least as far as we know, AI inhabits a
third-person perspective. We have no solid basis thus far to believe AI—or
even ASI—can achieve consciousness, exercise free will, experience a
unified self, or otherwise embody subjectivity, however that might best be
understood. This third-person, scientific perspective—so the intuition runs—
7. Andrew G. Simpson, 4 Million Driving Jobs at Risk from Autonomous Vehicles:
Report, INS. J. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/03/
27/445638.htm.
8. See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 47 (2011) (discussing this position by Hume).
For a general discussion of the distinction between the realms of fact and value, see RONALD
DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013).
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may not be capable of selecting ultimate ends9 as opposed to identifying and
pursuing means.
This limitation holds great importance if first-person decision-making—
or evaluation—is necessary to make moral and other value judgments. There
is reason to believe that the scientific perspective cannot fully capture firstperson decision-making.10 One way to assess this potential limitation is by
reviewing how the scientific view has attempted to make sense of various
phenomena relevant to the first-person perspective. These phenomena
include consciousness, free will, and the unified self. What we may find is
that the scientific worldview cannot offer an account of these phenomena
capable of explaining and guiding first-person decision-making. Science and
first-person decision-making, it seems, may be somewhat incompatible.
That incompatibility would be significant. A common—and particularly
compelling—justification for the scientific worldview is pragmatism.11
Science works. It makes planes that fly, lights that illuminate, and telephones
that communicate. Science’s practical utility provides reason to treat
naturalized materialism as a form—perhaps even the only form—of
knowledge. But if value judgments are necessary to direct our scientific and
other efforts, if first-person decision-making is necessary for value
judgments, and if science cannot fully capture first-person decision-making,
then science’s utility has constraints. Pragmatism may justify recognizing not
only a scientific realm of knowledge but also an outer boundary to that realm.
Treating scientific knowledge as the only form of knowledge may leave us
without the resources we need to make the decisions we need to make.
This sketch of a general philosophical claim finds a special application in
law. To the extent that legal practice requires moral (and other value)
judgments, a purely scientific account may not exhaust legal decisionmaking. Science may not be capable of creating machines that have the firstperson experiences necessary to exercise key judgments in the legal process.
And there is reason to believe that legal practice does require moral and other
9. I say ultimate ends—as opposed to ends—because given ultimate ends, AI may be
able to identify intermediate ends that can help to achieve the ultimate ends. See, e.g.,
TEGMARK, supra note 1, at 264 (discussing the relationship of subgoals and ultimate goals);
BOSTROM, supra note 5, at 132 (discussing the instrumental convergence thesis). This point
retains the distinction between fact and value. AI could identify intermediate ends relying
solely on ultimate ends provided to it and instrumental reasoning of a factual nature.
10. For an analysis that seems to hold this implication, see THOMAS NAGEL, MIND AND
COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF NATURE IS ALMOST
CERTAINLY FALSE (2012).
11. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN PHILOSOPHY 48-50 (2007).
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values judgments. According to natural law, saying what the law is (at least
sometimes) requires making moral judgments about what the law should be.
To be sure, some legal positivists deny that morality plays that role in the
law. But in defending that position, even legal positivists generally
acknowledge that moral judgments are often necessary in applying the law.12
These final points take us full circle. They suggest several conclusions:
judicial and other legal practitioners may need to be able to make moral and
other value judgments; subjectivity may be necessary to moral judgments,
restricting AI to the realm of science and precluding it from the realm of
value; and science may be incapable of fully capturing the kind of firstperson decision-making that is necessary for moral and other value
judgments. As far as we can tell, then, human beings may be uniquely
capable of a first-person perspective that is necessary to certain forms of
judicial and other legal practice. According to this line of reasoning, human
beings will have a role to play in the practice of law at least commensurate
with the role of moral and other value judgments.
Ultimately, an argument about the limits of AI in law along the above lines
would need to support three claims. First, moral judgments (and other value
judgments) are necessary for legal and judicial practice. Second, the
subjective perspective is necessary for such judgments. Third, computers
(and the material world in which they function) cannot achieve subjective
experience. This Essay does not make a full version of any of those
arguments. Its aim is more modest. Part I explores why it is likely that moral
judgments (and other value judgments) may be necessary for legal and
judicial practice. Part II explains how the subjective perspective may be
necessary for moral judgments and how that may be consistent with morality
nonetheless remaining objective in an important sense. Part III then provides
evidence that computers may be incapable of subjective experience.
I. Moral Judgments as Necessary in Legal and Judicial Practice
A. Moral Judgment in the Law
Moral judgments may require the first-person perspective—while
possibly nonetheless being objectively right or wrong—and AI may be
incapable of achieving the first-person perspective and therefore of making
moral judgments. If both propositions are true, then the scope of what AI can
do in the law would seem to depend on a longstanding and central dispute in

12. See infra Part I.
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jurisprudence: the role of morality in law.13 But it turns out that is only
partially accurate. It is true that natural lawyers, according to one
formulation, contend that the content of law depends ultimately in part on
moral judgments.14 It is also true that legal positivists, according to the same
formulation, deny that the content of the law depends ultimately on moral
judgments at all.15 But many of the most prominent jurisprudents—natural
lawyers and positivists alike—acknowledge that morality plays some role in
legal and judicial practice.
To see why this is so, it is worthwhile to review briefly the views of
different schools of thought about the central point of contention in
jurisprudence for the past fifty years or more: the relationship between law
and morality. A relatively straightforward account of the dispute includes
three positions: that morality plays a necessary role, a contingent role, or no
role at all. The position that morality plays a necessary role in legal
interpretation is often called natural law or anti-positivism. Among its most
famous recent exponents were Ronald Dworkin and Lon Fuller.16 Although
their theories vary a great deal in the particulars and emphasis, they both
subscribed to the view that moral judgment is necessary in saying what the
law is. If computers are unable to engage in moral reasoning, and if natural
law provides the best understanding of the nature of law, then computers can
play only a limited role in legal interpretation.
To be sure, that does not mean that computers can play no role at all. Take,
for example, the theoretical framework that Ronald Dworkin developed. He
viewed legal interpretation as entailing two forms of nested judgments: fit
13. This debate is often labeled the Hart-Dworkin debate, and it has been the main one in
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160,
1162 (2015) (“For more than forty years, jurisprudence has been dominated by the HartDworkin debate.”); Scott J. Shapiro, The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short Guide for the
Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN 22 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007) (“For the past four decades,
Anglo-American legal philosophy has been preoccupied—some might say obsessed—with
something called the ‘Hart-Dworkin’ debate.”). Hart and Dworkin’s disagreement was
germinal of ongoing disputes about legal positivism, with Hart likely the most influential
positivist of the past half century and Dworkin the most influential non-positivist.
14. See Joshua P. Davis, Legality, Morality, Duality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 55, 61-62
[hereinafter Davis, Legality, Morality, Duality]; see also Amy Salyzyn, Positivist Legal Ethics
Theory and the Law Governing Lawyers: A Few Puzzles Worth Solving, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1063, 1063 (2014) (describing positivism as concept that, “broadly speaking . . . informs a
particular view of the lawyer as governed in her actions by the legal entitlements at issue, as
opposed to, for example, considerations of morality or justice writ at large”).
15. See Davis, Legality, Morality, Duality, supra note 14, at 61-62.
16. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS]; LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969).
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and justification.17 Fit is a purely descriptive (or positive) assessment.18 It
asks how well a legal proposition fits the existing authoritative sources of
law. Justification, in contrast, requires a prescriptive (or normative)
assessment.19 The relevant inquiry is how normatively attractive various
competing legal propositions are that potentially fit the relevant authoritative
sources of law. So even under Dworkin’s anti-positivist jurisprudence,
computers might play a significant role. They may someday—perhaps
someday soon—be better than human beings at assessing fit. But if they
cannot make moral judgments, they will not be able to assess justification.
Moreover, as noted above, assessments about fit and justification are
“nested.” That is to say, the two kinds of judgments are not discrete. So, for
example, a judge needs to make relatively general or abstract assessments of
both fit and justification in deciding how she should go about interpreting the
law. Both kinds of judgment are relevant to determining whether, for
example, in interpreting a statute, a judge should consider its plain text, its
legislative history, the overall structure of the statutory system, or which
interpretation would make the legal system as just as possible. Only after
making those general assessments of both fit and justification will she be in
a position to make the more specific (or concrete) assessments about, for
example, the text of the statute and how just the potential interpretations of
that text would be.20 So one must be careful not to exaggerate the ease of
disentangling the judgments about fit and justification. Still, even in
Dworkin’s natural-law framework, a robo-judge unable to make moral
judgments at least in theory—and, likely, to some extent in practice—might
be asked to make useful judgments about fit.
A second jurisprudential position holds that morality plays a contingent—
not a necessary—role in saying what the law is. That school of jurisprudence
is known as inclusive legal positivism. It can be described as holding that the
content of law is dependent ultimately only on social facts but that those
social facts may permit or require legal interpreters to make moral judgments,
at least in some circumstances. The most famous modern inclusive legal
positivist was H.L.A. Hart,21 and the school includes other major figures,

17. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis, Cardozo’s Judicial Craft and What Cases Come to Mean,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 777, 809 (1993).
18. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 242-50 (1986).
19. See id. at 243-44.
20. See, e.g., Davis, Legality, Morality, Duality, supra note 14, at 94-95.
21. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
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such as Jules Coleman.22 According to inclusive legal positivism, it may be
a matter of social fact, for example, whether interpreting the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment entails only a factual
inquiry—perhaps into the practices at the time the amendment was
adopted—or whether it entails also a moral inquiry—perhaps whether a
practice today is in fact cruel. That social fact determines whether judges
must make moral judgments in interpreting the law. So according to inclusive
legal positivism, even if computers cannot make moral judgments, it may be
a contingent matter whether they will be able to interpret the law in any given
instance.
The third major jurisprudential position—exclusive legal positivism—
holds that moral facts do not play a role in determining the content of the law.
The content of law, according to this position, is purely a matter of social
fact. Major modern figures subscribing to this view include Joseph Raz,23
Scott Shapiro,24 and Brian Leiter.25 Exclusive legal positivism appears most
compatible with computers serving as judges or lawyers, at least if they
cannot make moral judgments.26 But that appearance may be deceiving.
The reason is that there is more to legal or judicial practice than legal
interpretation. Engaging in legal practice—whether as a judge or a lawyer—
may involve moral judgments, even if saying what the law is does not. The
major exclusive legal positivists have acknowledged this point. Consider
Joseph Raz. His jurisprudential position relies on a distinctive understanding
of the nature of authority. He claims the point of authority is to resolve moral
disputes.27 So, he contends, it is implicit in the nature of legal authority that
authoritative sources of law—e.g., statutes—preclude legal interpreters from
addressing the same underlying moral issues that the authoritative sources
22. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L.J. 2
(2011).
23. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY
OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON (2009).
24. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 47.
25. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 11.
26. One other jurisprudential school of thought worth mentioning is normative (or ethical)
legal positivism. Joshua P. Davis, Legal Ethics, Legal Dualism, and Fidelity to Law, 2016 J.
PROF. LAW. 1, 8 [hereinafter Davis, Legal Ethics]. It holds that the law may reflect moral (or
other normative) judgments at its foundation but only at its foundation. Id. Jeremey Waldron
has described this theory. See id. at 8 n.37 (citing Jeremey Waldron, Normative (or Ethical)
Positivism, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 411
(Jules Coleman ed., 2001)). Justice Scalia arguably fit into this category. Id. at 12-13. Note
that, according to the taxonomy in the text, that would make Justice Scalia a natural lawyer.
27. RAZ, supra note 23, at 4-7.
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were meant to resolve.28 But he does not deny that morality can play a role
in legal practice.29 His position instead is that even if morality informs legal
practice, it is not part of the law. He thus distinguishes between “the law of
the land”30—the law in a particular jurisdiction—and “standards that the
courts have to apply”—which are not part of the law of the land. He illustrates
his point by drawing an analogy to a British court applying Polish law under
British conflict-of-law rules.31 Foreign law, Raz reasons, may play a role in
legal practice. A judge may apply foreign law as a result of domestic choiceof-law rules, just as an attorney may do so. But that does not make foreign
law a part of domestic law. So it is with morality, Raz reasons.32 Whatever
the merits of this position—or of Raz’s theory of authority33—the point that
is relevant for present purposes is that Raz’s exclusive legal positivism does
not preclude judges or lawyers from making moral judgments in applying the
law, as opposed to interpreting it.
The same is true for Scott Shapiro’s jurisprudential theory, which has
important parallels to Raz’s. According to Shapiro, law is a kind of plan (or
a plan-like norm).34 Law as a plan provides a way to contend with various
difficulties that arise in complex societies, like ours. We face numerous
serious moral problems without obviously correct solutions, and yet we need
to resolve them—at least provisionally—so we can coordinate our behavior
and organize our lives. Shapiro labels this situation “the circumstances of
legality.”35 He claims that law as a plan (or plan-like norm) enables
coordination and at least temporary resolution of various moral disputes.
Exercising moral judgment in saying what the law is, he further reasons,
would defeat the purpose of law, given that its aim is to resolve moral
disagreements (again, at least temporarily) so that members of society can
plan their actions and go about their business. Much like Raz’s authority
theory, Shapiro’s planning theory purports to preclude a role for morality in
saying what the law is, but it leaves room for moral judgments in legal
practice, including in applying the law. Shapiro acknowledges, for example,
that a legal practitioner applying the legal standard of unreasonableness or
28. Id. at 190-93.
29. Id. at 195-98.
30. See id. at 198-99.
31. Id. at 199.
32. Id. at 201.
33. For a critique of Raz’s argument for exclusive legal positivism based on the notion of
authority, see RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 198-211 (2006).
34. SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 225.
35. Id. at 170-73, 213-14.
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unconscionability may have to make a moral judgment.36 He also invokes
Raz’s distinction between the laws of a jurisdiction and the “rules that judges
are under an obligation to apply.”37 The latter category, he claims, is bigger,
including the rules of English grammar and the laws of foreign
jurisdictions.38
Legal positivists—exclusive and inclusive alike—also acknowledge that
judges may exercise moral judgment when they make new law. According
to some legal positivists, when the law is indeterminate—jurisprudents
dispute how often that occurs—judges may have to make moral judgments
in formulating the governing legal standard. Shapiro, for example,
acknowledges that judges sometimes make new law and that when they do,
they may rely on moral judgments.39 The plan that is the law has not
contemplated a situation that has arisen. The compromise among competing
moral values and interests that society has adopted does not provide
determinate guidance. Recourse to underlying moral values may be
necessary to extend the law.40
Hart too recognized that the law sometimes is indeterminate. He thus
distinguished between cases located in the “core” of the law and those located
in its “penumbra.”41 Core cases lie within the settled meaning of the law
while penumbral cases require recourse to social purposes to reach a
determinate result.42 To be sure, Hart denied that the social purposes that
guide decision-making in the penumbra of the law must be moral.43 Not only
36. Id. at 276.
37. Id. at 272.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 272, 274-76. For a discussion of the role that Shapiro admits morality can play
in adjudication, and for the challenges that admission may raise for his theory, see Davis,
Legality, Morality, Duality, supra note 14, at 76-80.
Hart’s analysis is somewhat more complicated. He famously acknowledged that legal
interpreters must make judgments about the ends or purposes of law when cases fall in its
“penumbra.” See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). Whether those judgments are necessarily moral in character,
however, he disputed. Id. at 614. Note that this point can tie into the discussion of other value
judgments that also may be beyond the scope of AI.
40. SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 274-76; id. at 272 (“In other words, the fact that American
judges are under an obligation to apply nonpedigreed norms does not imply that they are
compelled to apply preexisting law; rather, they are merely under an obligation to reach
outside the law and apply the norms of morality instead.”).
41. Hart, supra note 39, at 607. Hart claimed that Austin recognized this issue as well. Id.
at 608-09.
42. Id. at 612, 614.
43. Id. at 612-13.
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moral aims can provide guidance when the law is indeterminate, according
to Hart, but so can “the most evil aims.”44 Not all jurisprudents agree with
this point.45 Assuming Hart was right, however, the conclusion does not
necessarily follow that computers can—or will be able to—make relevant
non-moral value judgments. Computers may have as great difficulty
assessing evil aims as good ones. Indeed, evil values can be understood as a
mirror image of good ones—or, if one prefers, as a photographic negative. In
that case, the same difficulties that impede robojudges or robolawyers in
pursuing moral aims may confound them in pursuing immoral ones. And the
same may be true for values that run orthogonal to good and evil—amoral
aims. In any case, the relevant aims of the law presumably are at least at times
moral, and when they are, computers would need to be able to make moral
judgments to engage in effective legal practice.
The point is that proponents of all of the major jurisprudential schools
recognize that morality can play some role in judicial and legal practice. They
may disagree on whether and when moral judgments are necessary to say
what the law is, but they agree that lawyers and judges at times must make
moral judgments in going about their business. So if AI is not capable of
making moral judgments, it cannot fully perform the role that people play in
the law.46
44. Id. at 613; see also id. at 629.
45. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart,
71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
46. Resolving jurisprudential disagreements would likely still matter for defining the
scope that AI can play in law. If, for example, AI cannot make moral judgments but it can
make all other necessary judgments, then exclusive legal positivists might conclude that AI
can say what the law is whereas natural lawyers might conclude that AI cannot do so. My own
view—explored elsewhere—is that legal positivism provides the best understanding of the
nature of law when an interpreter seeks merely to describe the law or to predict how others
will interpret it, but natural lawyers provide the best understanding of the nature of the law
when interpreters look to the law as a source of moral guidance. See, e.g., Davis, Legal Ethics,
supra note 26; Davis, Legality, Morality, Duality, supra note 14. That jurisprudential theory
can provide a useful account of the potential and limits for AI in law: as a powerful tool for
describing and predicting from the third-person perspective but as a limited tool for making
legal judgments from the first-person perspective.
A potential response to my argument could be to challenge the strong distinction I assume
exists between moral and non-moral claims. Along these lines, consider where Jules Coleman
ends his analysis of the architecture of jurisprudence. He suggests the importance for legal
positivism of challenging Hume’s Law—that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.”
Coleman, supra note 22, at 77-78. That is a crucial question from my perspective, both for
jurisprudence in general and for the role of AI in particular. Can AI derive an “ought” from
an “is”? If not, moral (and other value) judgments may place an outer limit on what computers
can do. If so, perhaps there is no such limit.
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B. Reciprocity and Moral Judgment
There is another reason to conclude that those who make legal judgments
must be capable of making moral judgments. It arises from what one might
call a principle of reciprocity. The logic is that those who impose legal
judgments on others must themselves be subject to the law. The law, in turn,
applies only to conscious actors capable of moral agency. We do not, for
example, allow criminal prosecutions of animals or inanimate objects.47
Scholars writing about AI and ethics have taken various approaches to the
principle of reciprocity. Bradley Wendel, for example, relies on ethical
theory. He writes of law as a way of imposing obligations, one that by its
nature requires mutuality. As he explains, “The law is a means for giving the
types of reasons that human moral agents owe to one another, in response to
others’ demands for accountability.”48 According to Wendel, the process of
reason giving necessarily occurs in the second person.49 It is relational. Thus,
those who make the relevant legal judgments—judges, but also at times
lawyers—must be moral agents themselves.50
Kiel Brennan-Marquez and Stephen Henderson make an argument
sounding in democratic theory to arrive at a similar conclusion. They contend
that it is essential in a democracy that the entity passing judgment under the
law could be subject to the law and vice versa.51 In that sense, the law is “selfimposed.”52 A judge—or, again, potentially a lawyer—must be able to say,
“There but for the grace of God go I” (or the secular equivalent). They
characterize their position as requiring “role-reversible judgment.”53

47. We similarly do not allow criminal prosecution of people with such diminished
capacity that they have no ability to tell right from wrong, although subtleties arise about
whether a defendant must be able to assess legality as opposed to morality. See, e.g., State v.
Winder, 979 A.2d 312, 318 (N.J. 2009). But note the complexities for applying the law to
people with diminished capacity. Note also that the very different demographics for areas of
the law—e.g., judges versus criminal defendants—cause difficulties, requiring an idealized
understanding of reciprocity.
48. W. Bradley Wendel, The Promise and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in the
Practice of Law, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 21, 42 (2019); see also id. at 26-27.
49. Id. at 26-27, 42.
50. Id.
51. Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and RoleReversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 149-56 (2019).
52. Id. at 153.
53. Id. at 149-52.
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Note that both of these lines of analysis assume that AI cannot properly be
a moral agent.54 At present, that seems like a reasonable assumption.
Computers do not appear to have moral agency or to warrant the equal
concern and respect that human beings do. But could they in the future? The
following Parts suggest reason to doubt that they will. Toward that end, Part
II explains why the first-person perspective is likely necessary for moral
judgment, and Part III provides reason to believe AI will not be able to
acquire a first-person perspective.
II. The First-Person Perspective as Necessary for Moral Judgment
It is the star to every wand’ring bark,
Whose worth’s unknown, although his height be taken.55
Russian gentleman: So who is to say what is moral?
Sonja: Morality is subjective.
Russian gentleman: Subjectivity is objective.
Sonja: Moral notions imply attributes to substances which exist
only in relational duality.
Russian gentleman: Not as an essential extension of ontological
existence.
Sonja: Can we not talk about sex so much?56
A. Reasons to Believe a Subjective Perspective Is Necessary for Morality
Subjectivity may be necessary for morality because morality involves
evaluation and choice in the realm of value. There is of course a great deal of
controversy about what moral judgments are and how one should go about
making them. What is at least somewhat less controversial is that someone—
with a distinct point of view—needs to make moral judgments.57 This is most
54. For an argument that focuses even more on process—based on an understanding of
litigation as integral to democracy—see ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION (2017).
Lahav’s argument provides another potential reason to limit the role of AI in litigation,
reserving a role for citizens and other participants in a healthy democratic process. That said,
if AI attains the first-person perspective, perhaps it should be able to participate in democratic
processes and, to that extent, in litigation.
55. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, SONNET 116.
56. LOVE AND DEATH (Jack Rollins & Charles H. Joffe Productions 1975).
57. See, e.g., SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION, supra note 4, at 110 (“One of the
weird features of recent intellectual life was the idea that consciousness—in the literal sense
of qualitative, subjective states and processes—was not important, that somehow it did not
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obvious if moral claims are really just statements of desires or preferences.58
Disembodied desires and preferences do not exist in the world. Someone
must have them.
Even if morality involves more than just desires or preferences—even if
moral claims can in some sense be true or false—subjectivity is likely
essential in making moral judgments. One way to get at this point is through
the fact-value distinction. In many—but not all—accounts of morality,
values do not exist in the physical world.59 They are not discoverable through
the empirical sciences—although empirical facts are relevant to moral
judgments.60 On these accounts of morality, a point of view is necessary to
identify moral principles or to assess the morality of particular actions.
We find some confirmation for this view in the current state of AI. To date,
it cannot select its own ultimate ends, moral or otherwise. Human beings
must define the goals AI will pursue. When it comes to “machine morality”—
to the possibility of AI pursuing moral ends—that leaves two main options:
a top-down approach61 and a bottom-up approach.62 First, in the top-down
approach, human beings can identify general moral principles for AI. Once
those are in place, they can constrain or direct what AI will attempt to
achieve. But AI cannot supply its own guiding principles or ultimate aims. It
operates in the realm of means, not ends.

matter. One reason this is so preposterous is that consciousness is itself the condition of
anything having importance. Only to a conscious being can there be any such thing as
importance.”); see also JOHN SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY 83 (1998) [hereinafter
SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY] (“Any attempt to describe consciousness, any
attempt to show how consciousness fits into the world at large, always seems to me inadequate.
What we are leaving out is that consciousness is not just an import feature of reality. There is
a sense in which it is the most important feature of reality because all other things have value,
importance, merit, or worth only in relation to consciousness. If we value life, justice, beauty,
survival, reproduction, it is only as conscious beings that we value them.”).
58. This view is often labeled moral nihilism. See, e.g., RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 292 (3d ed. 2015).
59. For a suggestion that morality may be objective but not reducible to at least current
understandings of scientific naturalism, see NAGEL, supra note 10, at 97-126 (chapter 5,
“Value”).
60. Note that a naturalized moral objectivity provides an exception to this view. For an
analysis along those lines, see PHILIP KITCHER, THE ETHICAL PROJECT (2011). This Essay
assumes that values cannot be reduced to the hard sciences. But an argument in support of that
position is beyond its scope.
61. WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT
FROM WRONG 83-97 (2009).
62. Id. at 99-115. Wallach and Allen also discuss a hybrid of the two. Id. at 117-24.
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In the second, bottom-up approach, AI is provided data about various
situations and the moral (or otherwise desirable) actions to be taken in them.
AI can then detect patterns of moral decision-making and use them for
guidance. Note in this approach, too, AI needs input from human beings.
Someone with a point of view must determine what the moral actions are in
particular situations. Without those judgments, AI would not have the data
necessary to detect patterns.
To be sure, there are other forms of moral judgment than either a pure topdown or bottom-up approach. One of the most widely recognized is the socalled “reflective equilibrium,” famously discussed by John Rawls, among
others.63 A reflective equilibrium can be understood as involving working
back and forth between general moral principles and intuitions about
morality in particular contexts.64 Each informs—and, ideally, corrects—the
other. For AI to pursue a reflective equilibrium, human beings would seem
to have to provide it at least three forms of guidance: a set of preliminary
general principles, a set of intuitions about the right outcomes in particular
cases, and a set of rules for reconciling conflicts or tensions between the two.
It is possible that once AI has the necessary inputs from human beings, it
could then make moral judgments independently. But there is reason to doubt
that would work in practice. One difficulty arises from change. New
circumstances may require new moral judgments. Of course, if the relevant
differences are reflected in the old data—if the salient distinctions have been
judged in the past—AI should be able to contend with them. But sometimes
new facts require novel moral judgments to place them within existing moral
frameworks. So as circumstances change over time, new human judgments
may be necessary for AI to adapt.
Moral values may also change. The reasons are not clear. Perhaps there is
moral progress. We may come to be more enlightened as the years pass. Or
perhaps values simply alter over time—not necessarily for better or for
worse. Regardless, morality does not seem to remain constant. As morality
changes, new human input will be necessary for AI to remain accurate in its
moral judgments. Human beings will need to alter or add to the moral
principles on which AI operates, the concrete moral judgments AI treats as
correct, or both.
Another, related difficulty involves error. The moral principles human
beings articulate, and the concrete moral judgments they make, are likely to
63. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
64. Rawls himself avoided use of the term intuition in this context, and whether doing so
is proper remains controversial. See Reflection Equilibrium, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Oct. 14, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/.
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be imperfect. To the extent they are tainted—by ignorance, confusion, selfinterest, simple mistakes, or whatever else—they will lead AI astray. As the
saying in statistics goes: garbage in, garbage out. To the extent that AI derives
its principles either directly from human instruction or from patterns of
human moral decisions, both may contain inaccuracies. Human intervention
may be necessary to correct the mistakes embedded in AI ethics by human
fallibility.
All of these issues will be expected to arise as long as AI engages in moral
reasoning at a level of remove: acting on human perceptions of morality
rather than on its own perceptions. So if it is correct that the subjective
perspective is necessary to make moral judgments, AI would likely need to
achieve subjectivity to displace the human role in moral reasoning.65
To the extent AI cannot make moral judgments directly, the discussion in
Part I suggests two limits for AI in law. First, human beings may need to play
some ongoing role in law because only they can assess morality directly.
They must provide the moral reasoning or intuitions to feed AI’s legal
analysis, at least when morality informs judicial or other legal decisionmaking. Second, human beings may need to play a role to the extent that
actors in the legal system have to be capable of moral agency. An example is
the principle of reciprocity discussed above—championed in different forms
by Wendel and by Brennan-Marquez and Henderson. If AI cannot make
direct moral judgments, it would seem incapable of the kind of moral agency
that the reciprocity principle requires.66 Before addressing reasons AI might
not be able to achieve subjectivity—and therefore might not be able to make
direct moral judgments—it is important to clarify different ways to
understand subjectivity and objectivity in morality.
B. How Morality Might Be Both Subjective and Objective
The notion that a subjective perspective is necessary for moral judgment
can be misleading. One might take it to mean that morality is subjective. But
that is not necessarily true. The reason is that the term subjectivity can have

65. There may also be an issue with coherence. It may be important that moral judgments
are coherent. See, e.g., AARON ZIMMERMAN, MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY 11 (2010). Synthesizing
moral principles and judgments from people with different perspectives may not generate a
single, coherent moral worldview. For related analyses of the limited potential of AI to make
moral judgments, see Joshua P. Davis, Law Without Mind: AI, Ethics, and Jurisprudence, 55
CAL. W. L. REV. 165, 186-95 (2018).
66. Even if AI could make direct moral judgments, it still might lack moral agency. Other
requirements of moral agency might include consciousness or free will. As discussed in Part
III, there is reason to doubt AI will be able to achieve either of those as well.
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multiple meanings, at least two of which are relevant for present purposes.67
The first is that a subjective perspective is necessary to make moral
judgments. The second is that there is no objectively correct view about
whether a moral claim is right or wrong. It is possible that morality may be
subjective in the first sense—subjective experience may be necessary to
make moral judgments—but not in the second sense—there may be right and
wrong answers to (at least some) moral questions.68
Of course, to say that something is conceptually possible is not to say that
it is true. This Section makes a claim about the former, not the latter. The
issues this Part briefly explores are highly controversial. Philosophers—and
others—disagree about the ways in which subjective experience is necessary
to make moral judgments and also about whether moral judgments can be
objectively true. This Part does not attempt to resolve either controversy.
Instead, it seeks to describe a view that could combine subjectivity in one
regard with objectivity in the other regard.
It is also true that some philosophers—and others—relate the two issues
above to each other. They believe that whether moral judgments can be
objectively true depends in part on whether they can be tested from what one
might call a third-person perspective. Objective truth, according to a version
of this view, might require that there be some sort of moral entity that science
can detect and measure. From this vantage, it may be that if morality is
subjective in the sense that moral judgment requires a subjective perspective,
it follows that morality is also subjective in the sense that there are no
objectively correct answers to moral questions.
This analysis relates to AI because, as discussed below, it is not clear that
AI is capable of attaining a subjective perspective. If the subjective
perspective is required for moral judgment, then morality may be something
AI cannot discern. And if legal or judicial practice at times requires moral
judgment, then the role of AI in law may be circumscribed. All of that may
be true—at least in theory—whether moral claims are objective or subjective
(or something else).
The Scientific Perspective. To situate these points, it is important to clarify
a few terms. The first is the scientific perspective, or what one might more
technically call a naturalized, materialist reductionism. The notion is that all
67. For a similar discussion about the different potential meanings of subjectivity, see, for
example, SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION, supra note 4, at 94-95.
68. For arguments in favor of a non-naturalized moral objectivity, see, for example, RUSS
SHAFER-LANDAU, MORAL REALISM: A DEFENCE (2003). I understand Thomas Nagel also to
suggest a possibility along these lines. See NAGEL, supra note 10, at 97-126 (chapter 5,
“Value”).
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knowledge can be reduced to what science can assess in the world. Defining
the outer bounds of that science is controversial. It would presumably include
at least physics, chemistry, and biology, which, as science advances, might
collapse into one another. Other fields of study, such as psychology, might
not be fully compatible with a naturalized, materialist reductionism. To the
extent psychology uses empirical methods, it may well qualify as a true
science. Over time, it may reduce first to biology, then to chemistry, and then
to physics. But talk of the ego, the id, and the superego might disappear—or
at least be mapped to concepts in the harder sciences—and so might the
notion of the subconscious.69 This Essay will treat the scientific perspective
as equivalent to a naturalized, materialist reductionism.
Subjective Experience and Morality. To say that moral knowledge
requires subjective experience can be understood as meaning that morality is
not directly discernable from the scientific perspective.70 The claim is that
physics, chemistry, biology, and any other hard sciences cannot assess moral
propositions. According to this view, there are no moral entities out in the
physical world to be detected. Something about subjective experience—
about a conscious mind and perhaps even a mind capable of selfconsciousness, cognition, or both—is necessary to exercise moral judgment.
Subjectively Discerned Objective Morality. The above discussion could
lead to doubt about the existence of objective moral truth. That could come
from combining the scientific perspective with a belief that a subjective
perspective is necessary for moral judgments. One might then believe that
precisely because science cannot detect moral facts, those “facts” cannot be
objectively true. Reasoning along these lines has led some philosophers to
doubt moral objectivity. But there is another possibility. It may be that the
scientific perspective is capable of leading to truth about the physical world,
but that there are other realms of knowledge and that morality is one of them.
The criteria for truth in morality may be different from the criteria for truth
in science. Yet there still may be objective moral truths. Recent philosophers
have pursued views along these lines.71 They believe in non-naturalized
objective moral objectivity. The arguments for and against that position are
69. See infra text accompanying notes 114-19 (discussing a modular understanding of
consciousness).
70. Although science may not be able to discern morality directly, it can detect the
expressed beliefs and conduct of moral agents. That may prove important in assessing the
limits of AI.
71. See, e.g., SHAFER-LANDAU, supra note 68; THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD 101-25
(1997) (chapter 6, “Ethics”); Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You Better Believe It,
25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996).
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extensive, intricate, and complex. This Essay will not attempt to engage
them, much less resolve them.72
A brief summary of the above discussion may be helpful. The scientific
perspective—a naturalized, materialist reductionism—holds that knowledge
is available only through the hard sciences. One challenge to that view asserts
that moral knowledge requires a subjective perspective and that, even though
it does, moral claims may be objectively true (or false). If a challenge to the
scientific perspective along these lines proves persuasive, then reasoning
within the confines of science may not be capable of assessing the truth vel
non of moral propositions. Morality may be objective in the sense that there
are right and wrong answers to moral questions but subjective in the sense
that knowledge about morality is accessible only from a subjective
perspective, not from the scientific perspective.
This possibility sets the stage for investigating a possible limitation on the
role AI can play in law (and other disciplines that may require moral
judgments). AI appears to operate within the scientific realm. It may not be
capable of attaining the subjective perspective and, if it cannot, it may not be
able to make moral judgments (and perhaps other value judgments). That
may set an outer boundary on the role computers can play in legal and judicial
practice.
III. Reasons to Believe Computers Cannot Achieve Subjectivity
Whether computers are capable of having subjective experiences is no
trivial issue. Again, this Essay does not seek to resolve it. But it does explore
reasons to doubt that AI is capable of subjectivity. Its strategy is to note two
related points: first, as far as we know, computers and all they do seem to be
explicable in purely materialist terms, and, second, a materialist, scientific
view has not yet been able to capture key aspects of subjectivity. To be sure,
it may be that computers may someday achieve subjective experience. But,
if so, we have no account at present of the conditions that would have to
obtain for them to do so. It may also be true that someday we will develop a

72. At least one point does seem worth noting for the reader inclined to dismiss nonnaturalized moral objectivity out of hand. An argument that the scientific perspective exhausts
objective knowledge would not seem able to rely just on the scientific perspective without
question-begging. Some larger perspective is necessary that can assess different potential
forms of knowledge. That creates at least a challenge for the claim that the only truths worthy
of the name are scientific truths. If that proposition itself is true, it would appear to be a nonscientific truth. Put differently, the philosophical argument that provides the foundation for
the scientific view would not itself seem to be purely scientific.
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materialist, reductionist account that fully captures subjective experience.73
But we have not done so yet. Or so this Part argues. It explores the ways in
which a scientific account of subjective experience is incomplete. Assuming
that computers remain restricted to the realm of science, they therefore may
not be able to achieve subjective experience. To the extent moral judgment
requires subjective experience, computers—and AI—would then seem
unable to make full moral judgments. Further, first-person decision-making
in law seems to require moral judgments. So AI may not be able to displace
entirely human beings in legal and judicial practice.
Part III explores the above line of reasoning by reviewing various
controversies in the philosophy of mind. The scientific perspective has put
great pressure in particular on three traditional notions: consciousness, free
will, and the unified self. In each area, this Part argues, the scientific
perspective has not yet fully captured the first-person perspective, at least not
in ways that are capable of performing first-person decision-making.
A. Consciousness as an Illusion
Cogito, ergo sum.74
Je pense donc je suis.75
I think therefore I am.
A particularly provocative claim about consciousness is that it is an
illusion. Various theorists have made versions of this claim, perhaps most
notably Daniel Dennett.76 There is controversy about what the claim
entails—and about whether its proponents are consistent in characterizing the
proposition. For present purposes, regardless of the positions theorists in fact
73. John Searle takes a particularly interesting position on these issues. He characterizes
his position as naturalist but not as eliminative reductionist. In other words, he believes it will
ultimately prove possible to explain first-person experiences as part of the natural world and
that it will not prove necessary to deny the existence of first-person experiences to maintain
our commitment to science. See, e.g., SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION, supra note 4, at
79-80. He labels his position “biological naturalism.” Id. at 79. The notion is that
consciousness is a “higher-level” feature—or an “emergent quality”—of the biological brain.
Id. at 79-80; SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY, supra note 57, at 52-54; JOHN SEARLE,
THE MYSTERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 8, 13, 161, 210-14 (1997) [hereinafter SEARLE, MYSTERY
OF CONSCIOUSNESS]. A full discussion of Searle’s position and its implications is beyond the
scope of this Essay.
74. RENATI DES-CARTES [RENE DESCARTES], PRINCIPIA PHILOSOPHIÆ pt. I, § 7, at 2
(1644), https://www.wdl.org/en/item/3157/view/1/29/.
75. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA METHODE 32 (Paris, Leopold Cerf, 1902) (1637),
https://zulu-ebooks.com/send/3-fachbuecher/859-discours-de-la-methode.
76. E.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 309-14 (1991).
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adopt, it is perhaps most useful to start with the claim in its most
straightforward form: we do not really have consciousness; we just think we
do.
If consciousness does not really occur—if we only think it does, whatever
that means—then the first-person perspective too would seem to be an
illusion. Consciousness is constitutive of a person’s perspective. Without
consciousness, there is no first-person perspective and hence no need for
science to capture it.
But the claim that consciousness is an illusion seems self-defeating. An
illusion—of all things—is a creature of perspective. It is an instance in which
subjective experience conflicts with reality. Without subjective experience,
no such conflict is possible. Without conscious beings, no one is capable of
experiencing an illusion.
Moreover, consciousness is the one aspect of the world that we experience
directly. Careful analysis of anything else we think we know about reality
shows how tenuous our knowledge is.77 This is not the place to explore
longstanding debates about the extent to which we impose frameworks of
knowledge on the world as opposed to derive those frameworks from the
world. But those debates are vexing enough for many to find wisdom in
Descartes’ famous pronouncement, “I think therefore I am.” Our conscious
experiences provide us a thin reed of knowledge in the face of radical doubt.
Our ability to doubt arguably provides us the most reliable evidence we have
about the world—that, if nothing else, there is a self capable of doubting.78
Why then deny consciousness exists? One answer is that it provides a way
to sidestep a profound problem that has yet to be solved: the relationship
between the physical world and conscious existence. The difficulty in this
regard is apparent in the debate over a famous thought experiment by the
philosopher John Searle: the Chinese Room. Searle asks you to imagine you
are in a locked room. You understand only English. You receive various
written materials in Chinese. You have various sets of instructions in English
for correlating the batches of Chinese texts, relying only on their shapes. By
following the instructions, you are able to conduct a “conversation” in
Chinese about stories written in Chinese, responding to questions in a way
that would fool a native speaker. Searle contends that you still do not
understand Chinese merely because you are able—through the instructions—
to simulate an understanding of Chinese. You are just “manipulating

77. For a classic argument, see GEORGE BERKELEY, TREATISE CONCERNING
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE (1710).
78. See NAGEL, supra note 10, at 82.
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uninterpreted formal symbols.”79 He reasons that the same is true, in effect,
for computers. They can be built to appear to understand language but that
does not necessarily mean that they really understand, not the way human
beings do. This thought experiment has created quite a stir. It provoked
various responses. Searle has replied to many of them.80 Neither side seems
persuaded by the other.
At the core of this persistent disagreement over Searle’s thought
experiment arguably lies our ignorance about how biology gives rise to a
conscious mind. As a result, one might say that how persuasive the thought
experiment is depends on where one begins one’s analysis. On one hand, it
does seem obvious—as Searle argues—that a more complicated version of
his thought experiment would not necessarily change the result. Mere
manipulation of symbols is not enough for understanding—or relatedly, as
Searle puts it, syntax does not constitute or suffice for semantics.81
On the other hand, it is not clear what physical states give rise to a
conscious mind—or what needs to be added to syntax to constitute and
suffice for semantics. How does human physiology—including the brain and
other parts of our physical being—differ from complicated computers? One
might think of human beings and computers as consisting of two parts. Call
them hardware and software or substrate and pattern.82 What, if anything, is
so special about our biological form that can sustain a mind in a way that a
computer cannot? Many modern thinkers believe ultimately in a materialist
naturalism that leads to reductionism. For them, it would seem, the answer is
nothing—nothing is so special about our biology that precludes a computer

79. John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 417, 418
(1980).
80. For a useful summary of the literature and arguments, see Josef Moural, The Chinese
Room Argument in CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS: JOHN SEARLE 214-60 (Barry Smith
ed., 2003).
81. It is important to be clear about Searle’s argument. He does not deny that computers
may at some point become conscious. His position instead is that just because a computer can
simulate consciousness does not necessarily mean it is conscious. SEARLE, MYSTERY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 73, at 13-15, 110. He rejects in particular the notion that the mind
is merely a computer, and the apparent corollary that any computer that can simulate
consciousness has achieved consciousness. See SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION, supra
note 4, at 46-52 (explaining the computer theory of the mind); id. at 58-73 (presenting
arguments against the computer theory of the mind and other forms of materialism and
responding to potential counterarguments).
82. See TEGMARK, supra note 1, at 24-30 (discussing hardware and software); id. at 6567 (discussing substrate-independent patterns).
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from supporting a conscious mind.83 From that perspective, the Chinese
Room experiment is just a clever way to require us to identify when the ghost
enters the machine, even though we have no satisfactory account of what the
ghost is or how it can exist at all.
Calling consciousness an illusion may just be a way to sidestep this
difficulty. If we cannot reconcile our scientific account of the physical world
and conscious experience—if we cannot build an equation that includes
both—one solution would be to deny that we need such an equation. That
view is manifest in Searle’s claim that denying consciousness is not a
solution to the hard problem but a way of avoiding it. Such an approach
“changes the subject. It is not about consciousness, but rather a third-person
account of external behavior.”84
For present purposes we need not resolve this debate (thank goodness!).
Two more modest points are relevant: first, whatever the merits of denying
consciousness, doing so is unlikely to provide guidance for the first-person
perspective; and, second, even if denying consciousness entirely does not
advance first-person thinking or decision-making, some insights from
science about how the mind works may do so. Each of these points warrants
a bit of elaboration.
Let us begin with the first point: whatever the best third-person account of
consciousness is—that it is an illusion or something else—the claim that
consciousness is an illusion is unhelpful from a first-person perspective.
Accepting that consciousness is not real does not provide guidance for our
(apparent) conscious perspective. When someone sits down to mull a
decision—whether it is about what to do on a rainy Saturday or what the best
interpretation of a legal precedent is—the notion that the person is not really
conscious does not seem capable of advancing the effort at all. Someone may
think she is thinking and yet be mistaken, but if she is mistaken, how can she
proceed differently? What alternative does she have to engaging in what feels
like a conscious process for arriving at the best decision she can make?
That first point may lead us to conclude that scientific insights cannot
inform first-person thinking at all. But doing so could be imprudent. While
our first-person perspective likely cannot abandon the notion of
consciousness—our first-person perspective would not benefit from denying
its own existence—more modest scientific claims may have practical value
for the first-person perspective. Put differently, even if consciousness is not
83. For a fascinating discussion of these issues, with an iconoclastic skepticism about
materialistic naturalism and its associated reductionism, see NAGEL, supra note 10.
84. SEARLE, MYSTERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 73, at 123 (replying to Daniel C.
Dennett).
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just an illusion, some of our conscious experience may consist of illusions.
Recognizing that is so may lead to insights that can improve our first-person
experiences and decision-making, even if they do not cause us to abandon
the notion of consciousness entirely. This last point finds useful application
to a related proposition: that free will is an illusion.
B. Free Will as an Illusion
We must believe in free will. We have no choice.85
Don’t believe everything you think.86
A similar analysis applies to the related—and fraught—concept of free
will. Philosophers have developed fascinating and complex ways of
understanding the nature of free will, determinism, and moral responsibility,
and the relationship between them. These are worth canvassing, at least
briefly. But what matters most for present purposes is that the philosophical
debates have focused on the third-person perspective—about the best
objective understanding of free will—and not on the first-person
perspective—what is useful for first-person decision-making. As a result,
arguably much of the debate cannot helpfully inform first-person decisionmaking—much, but not all. There may be some knowledge and insights from
the literature on free will than can help people—including lawyers and judges
engaging in legal and judicial practice—in making decisions.
To frame this discussion, we should define some key terms. Unfortunately,
there is no uncontroversial definition of free will. Nor is there an
uncontroversial way to characterize the relationship between free will,
determinism, and moral responsibility. That said, it is useful to have at least
some working notions in mind. One way to define free will is as requiring
“alternative possibilities or the power to do otherwise.”87 In other words,
according to this definition, a person has free will if she could have acted
differently than she did—she had the power to choose an alternative course
of action. A second way to define free will is that the person is the “ultimate
source” of her free actions—or she is the ultimate source of her will to
perform free actions.88 Note that these two definitions are not the same. A

85. Stefan Kanfer, Isaac Singer’s Promised City, CITY J., Summer 1997, https://www.
city-journal.org/html/isaac-singer%E2%80%99s-promised-city-11935.html.
86. CafePress Bumper Sticker, https://www.amazon.com (search query: “CafePress
Don’t Believe Everything You Think”).
87. E.g., JOHN MARTIN FISCHER ET AL., FOUR VIEWS ON FREE WILL 1 (2007) [hereinafter
FOUR VIEWS ON FREE WILL].
88. Id.
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person, for example, might have been able to take only a single relevant
action, given who she is and her environment, but she might nonetheless be
understood as having acted on her own free will if she engaged in the
appropriate kind of decision-making, unconstrained, for example, by certain
kinds of internal pressures (e.g., a brain tumor) and external pressures (e.g.,
a gun to the head).
In categorizing the different philosophical schools of thought on free will,
it is useful to ask of each whether its adherents believe that free will is
compatible with determinism. Determinism can be defined as requiring “that
at any time the universe has [only] one physically possible future.”89 Socalled “incompatibilists” believe that free will and determinism are not
compatible, and “compatibilists” believe that they are. One major view
within incompatibilism is held by libertarians, who believe we do have free
will and reject determinism. Another such major view is held by hard
incompatibilists, who believe that we lack free will (and may or may not
believe the world is deterministic). Incompatibilists generally agree that
determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility, so that libertarians
believe that we do have moral responsibility for our actions and hard
incompatibilists believe that we do not. Compatibilism takes many forms,
and many compatibilists believe that moral responsibility is consistent with
determinism.90
The arguments made by philosophers in each of these schools are subtle
and complex, as are the variations on the proposed solutions to the problem
of free will. Most of them have no obvious bearing on the issues before us.
In particular, if we reflect on our own experiences as first-person decisionmakers, we are likely to offer an account of free will that is rarely held among
philosophers: a commonsense libertarianism. We experience ourselves as
having a range of options available to us, as being free to select among them,
and as making a choice through an exercise in agency that is affected but not
determined by our environment or our physical constitution (or by any
chance occurrences that may happen in one or the other). Further, we
experience our process of deliberation as determining the choices that we
make. If we were to reason differently—or to abandon reason in favor of our
intuitions or “gut instincts” or vice versa—we might act in some other
manner than we do.

89. Id. at 2.
90. Id. at 4.
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Sam Harris—a hard incompatibilist—captures these experiences nicely.
He writes:
Our moral intuitions and sense of personal agency are anchored to
a felt sense that we are the conscious source of our thoughts and
actions. When deciding whom to marry or which book to read, we
do not feel compelled by prior events over which we have no
control. The freedom that we presume for ourselves and readily
attribute to others is felt to slip the influence of impersonal
background causes.91
In other words, we experience ourselves as having a particularly free version
of free will. To paraphrase Aristotle, we believe ourselves to be unmoved
movers.92
Contrast this account with what one might think of as a sophisticated
libertarianism. Robert Kane offers a thoughtful philosophical argument for
libertarianism. But to make it robust—to make it stand up to sophisticated
critics—his account strays far from the actual experience of decision-making
that we likely find familiar. He is skeptical, for example, of the claim that
there is a source of action within us that cannot be explained in traditional
scientific—and empirical—terms.93 To make room for libertarianism, then,
he concedes that most decision-making may not be consistent with free will.
And he attempts to provide a materialist account of free will, one based in
brain science.
Toward that end, he identifies conduct at key inflection points—which he
calls “undetermined self-forming actions”—that can change the course of our
lives.94 He offers as an example a businesswoman who is on her way to an
important meeting when she witnesses an assault in an alley, forcing her to
choose between her conscience—her desire to help the victim—and her
91. SAM HARRIS, FREE WILL 16-17 (2012).
92. For arguments that we cannot help but experience free will in this way see, for
example, DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 16, at 224 (“In the first person,
deciding includes assuming judgmental responsibility; the connection is internal and
independent of any premise about the causes of decision. Pessimistic noncompatabilism is not
an intellectually stable position. It asks us to believe what we cannot believe.”); SEARLE, MIND:
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION, supra note 4, at 153-54 (“Whenever we decide or act voluntarily,
which we do throughout the day, we have to decide or act on the presupposition of our own
freedom. Our deciding and acting are unintelligible to us otherwise. We cannot think away
our own free will.”).
93. Robert Kane, Libertarianism in FOUR VIEWS ON FREE WILL, supra note 81, at 5, 2425.
94. Id. at 26.
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ambition—her commitment to attend the meeting.95 He then combines
parallel processing in the brain with chaos theory and quantum mechanics to
argue that on these unusual—but important, indeed formative—occasions, it
is possible that people “make one set of competing reasons or motives prevail
over the others then and there by deciding.”96 Whatever the merits of this
approach as a third-person account of free will,97 it seems to cede too much
to non-libertarianism to capture the first-person experiences of most people
as they make many routine conscious decisions. Harris’s commonsense
description of libertarianism provides a more familiar description of our firstperson experience. It reflects our decision-making process as we ordinarily
understand it from the inside.
Harris also makes another important observation: that the deliberative
process matters (although he believes it is the product of other forces and
chance):
And the fact that our choices depend on prior causes does not
mean that they don’t matter. If I had not decided to write this book,
it wouldn’t have written itself. My choice to write it was
unquestionably the primary cause of its coming into being.
Decisions, intentions, efforts, goals, willpower, etc., are causal
states of the brain, leading to specific behaviors, and behaviors
lead to outcomes in the world. Human choice, therefore, is as
important as fanciers of free will believe. But the next choice you
make will come out of the darkness of prior causes that you, the
conscious witness of your experience, did not bring into being.98
The last sentence gives the reader a fuller and fairer sense of Harris’s view,
but it is the rest of the quotation that matters for the present discussion. Harris
acknowledges the importance of decisions, intentions, efforts, goals, and
even will power. They are, as he says, causal states of the brain. And
presumably we would not necessarily take the same actions we do if we did

95. Id.
96. Id. at 26-27.
97. It is a fair question whether Kane has provided an adequate alternative to the notion
of “agent-causation,” which he rejects, id. at 25, or whether instead he has relegated it to a
small but crucial role. In other words, one might doubt that he has provided an adequate
account of how the physical world can involve actions other than those that are predetermined
or produced by chance events (quantum mechanics) without appealing to the notion of agentcausation. But addressing that issue is beyond the scope of this Essay.
98. HARRIS, supra note 91, at 34.
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not engage in our ordinary deliberative process, the one that feels like it is
driven by our uncaused causal agency (which Harris believes is illusory).99
Harris’s view is that we would do better to accept determinism and
abandon notions of free will and moral responsibility. We should not blame
people for the actions they take and the harms they cause, any more than we
would blame a dog for attacking someone or, if you prefer, a bolt of lightning
for striking someone. We should instead ask a prospective and practical
question: what steps should we take to prevent undesirable future harms?
There is much to say in favor of Harris’s view and much to say against it. But
the point here is not to assess whether Harris’s philosophical argument for
determinism is persuasive, and so there is no need to explore it further. His
focus is on a third-person perspective—how we should evaluate human
behavior from the outside—and the inquiry before us is about the first-person
perspective.
Harris has some useful points to make about the first-person perspective
as well. As noted above, he recognizes how we ordinarily experience firstperson decision-making. He also suggests a deterministic first-person
alternative. He touches on it only briefly, as his focus is on third-person truth.
In particular, Harris ends his book on free will by attempting to offer a firstperson account of determinism. It is hard to describe it other than as striking
a false note. Consider how he describes his decision to conclude his book,
Free Will:
What brings my deliberations on these matters to a close? This
book must end sometime—and now I want to get something to
eat. Am I free to resist the feeling? Well, yes, in the sense that no
one is going to force me at gunpoint to eat—but I am hungry. Can
I resist this feeling a moment longer? Yes, of course—and for an
indeterminate number of moments thereafter. But I don’t know
why I make the effort in this instance and not in others. And why
do my efforts cease precisely when they do? Now I feel that it
really is time for me to leave. I’m hungry, yes, but it also seems
that I’ve made my point. In fact, I can’t think of anything else to
say on the subject. And where is the freedom in that?100
In an otherwise insightful analysis, what stands out as particularly
implausible is Harris’s description of why he stopped writing his book when
99. Id. at 5 (“Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own making.
Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over
which we exert no conscious control. We do not have the freedom we think we have.”).
100. Id. at 66.
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he did. It does not seem credible that he ended the book because he was
hungry. Did he write the entire tome one day between breakfast and lunch?
Writing—and rewriting—is a highly deliberative process. It involves careful
thought, revision, reflection, and methodical action. Why would hunger
pangs cause him to alter his plans?
Nor is it plausible that, spur of the moment, he could not think of anything
else to say. His short book reveals an efficiency and restraint inconsistent
with an extemporaneous decision to stop writing and grab a bite to eat.
Presumably, he organized his thoughts in an outline—formal or informal, in
his head, on a screen, or on a notepad—and worked through it over many
days, if not weeks or months, reviewing, revising, and mulling as he went
along. Indeed, as discussed above, he acknowledges that deliberation plays a
causal role in decision-making.101 So his implication that writing a book is a
sort of obviously mysterious process—with conscious decision-making
playing little to no role—does not ring true.102
That said, Harris may be right that mystery shrouds the ultimate sources
of preferences—why we like chocolate ice cream more than vanilla ice cream
or ice skating more than basketball (if we prefer skating because we think
artistry for its own sake is more pleasing than artistry in the service of a
concrete goal, then why do we hold that view?).103 From a first-person
perspective, however, we have significant control over how much of our
decision-making process is based on something that approximates an
101. John Searle takes a similar position on the causal role of consciousness in human
action, one for which he offers a particularly intriguing philosophical argument. See, e.g.,
SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY, supra note 57, at 58-62, 104-07; SEARLE, MIND: A
BRIEF INTRODUCTION, supra note 4, at 91, 136-50.
102. Harris elsewhere recognizes this distinction. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 91, at 3233 (“This is not to say that conscious awareness and deliberative thinking serve no purpose.
Indeed, much of our behavior depends on them. I might unconsciously shift in my seat, but I
cannot unconsciously decide that the pain in my back warrants a trip to a physical therapist.
To do the latter, I must become aware of the pain and be consciously motivated to do
something about it. Perhaps it would be possible to build an insentient robot capable of these
states—but in our case, certain behavior seems to require the presence of conscious thoughts.
And we know that the brain systems that allow us to reflect upon our experience are different
from those involved when we automatically react to stimuli. So consciousness in this sense,
is not inconsequential.”).
103. Id. at 39 (“Choices, efforts, intentions, and reasoning influence our behavior—but
they are themselves part of a chain of causes that precede conscious awareness and over which
we exert no ultimate control. My choices matter—and there are paths toward making wiser
ones—but I cannot choose what I choose. And if it ever appears that I do—for instance, after
going back and forth between two options—I do not choose to choose what I choose. There is
a regress here that always ends in darkness.”).
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automatic reaction and how much we subject to a more careful, deliberative
process, even if the ultimate source of our beliefs, feelings, intuitions, and
the like may remain obscure to us. From a first-person perspective, we
experience ourselves as having a choice about how careful we are in making
the decisions that we make.104 In that sense, whatever the merits of
determinism105 as a third-person account of human decision-making, it fails
to capture our first-person experience.
Here science may inform our understanding of our options. The firstperson perspective can accommodate—and perhaps benefit from—
distinguishing between the mindlessly automatic and the mindfully
reflective. Consider Daniel Kahneman’s famous distinction between fast and
slow thinking.106 Fast thinking is quick, automatic, easy, based on heuristics,
and prone to various cognitive biases. Slow thinking, in contrast, is sluggish,
deliberate, and difficult, and can be logical and can overcome cognitive
biases.
Consider also a fascinating set of experiments by Benjamin Libet that bear
on free will. Subjects were asked to choose when to flex their wrists.107 They
experienced making a conscious choice to do so. But monitoring of their
brains suggested that the initial brain activity associated with a physical
movement occurred well before the subjects experienced a conscious
decision to act.108 The conscious “decision,” then, may have been a post
hoc—and non-causal—step in a process that was in fact initiated in a nonconscious manner. Later experiments—by Libet and others—appear to
confirm this timing.109 But Libet did additional experiments suggesting that
while certain—apparently unconscious—brain activity was a necessary
predicate for movement, people were able to make a conscious decision later
in the process not to move. This has been cleverly put as showing that while
we may not have free will, we have “free won’t.”110 The parallel to
Kahneman’s model of fast and slow thinking is intriguing. Perhaps people,
104. I am not claiming that Harris denies this; to the contrary, I understand him to
acknowledge it.
105. By determinism here, I do not mean to exclude a possible role for chance, such as is
implied by quantum mechanics. Id. at 27-30.
106. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013).
107. Benjamin Libet, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in
Voluntary Action, 8 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 529, 529-30 (1985).
108. Id. at 536.
109. See, e.g., SUSAN BLACKMORE & EMILY T. TROSCIANKO, CONSCIOUSNESS: AN
INTRODUCTION 231 (3d ed. 2018) (citing M. Shultze-Kraft et al., The Point of No Return in
Vetoing Self-Initiated Movements, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1080 (2016)).
110. Id. (quoting a personal communication from Richard Gregory).
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from the first-person perspective, can impose conscious decisions to act—or
not to act—on their non-conscious reactions, leading to more intentional and
hopefully wiser behavior.
None of this necessarily falsifies the claim—by Harris and others—that
free will understood in the commonsense libertarian way does not exist. But
it does seem to create space from within the first-person perspective for
distinguishing decisions made in an automatic and thoughtless manner from
those that are deliberate and conscious. And that distinction may preserve a
realm for what human beings are uniquely capable of doing—and what
computers may not be capable of doing.
This discussion of free will, then, tends to support a few relevant points.
First, the third-person, scientific perspective fails to capture in important
ways the first-person experience of free will. Second, and related, the
scientific, reductionist perspective has limited utility for the first-person
perspective, particularly when it comes to decision-making. Third, some
insights from science may usefully inform first-person decision-making, but
only when they are relatively modest and do not purport to displace free will
entirely. Similar points apply to the notion of a unified self.
C. The Unified Self as an Illusion
There was a faith healer from Deal
Who said ‘though I know pain isn’t real.
If I sit on a pin,
And it punctures my skin,
I dislike what I fancy I feel.
1. The Singular Self at a Given Time
Another way in which a scientific, third-person account of consciousness
appears to deviate from our first-person experience involves the unified self.
We generally experience ourselves as having a singular conscious existence.
I may have mixed motives or ambivalence about some matters, but I am only
one person, not two or more people occupying a single body and competing
with one another, negotiating internal compromises, and the like.
There may be exceptions. We are fascinated, for example, by people who
suffer from what is commonly called multiple personality disorder, and more
formally known as dissociative identity disorder or “DID.”111 People with
multiple personalities do not seem to have a single identity but rather multiple

111. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
DISORDERS code 300.14 (5th ed. 2013) (under “Dissociative Disorders”).
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identities vying for control and surfacing at different times. At times DID has
captured the popular imagination, including in shows such as The United
States of Tara. But we think of DID as an aberration and foreign to our
ordinary experience. Indeed, that is in part why we are fascinated by it. It
seems unreal, like magic or superpowers. Unsurprisingly, DID is a source of
controversy within the psychiatric profession. Ordinary people may find it so
hard to relate to people with multiple personalities that a natural response is
to believe they are pretending.
It is therefore all the more surprising—and fascinating—that science has
suggested a model for consciousness that in some ways is similar to DID.112
One way to get at this point is to consider what Daniel Dennett has usefully
called the “Cartesian Theatre.”113 Many of us have a sense that there is a
unified self that has various experiences. It takes in information from our five
senses and in response has various feelings and thoughts and makes various
decisions. But scientists suggest that may not be how our brains work.
The difficulty lies in part in that there is no identifiable part of the brain
that serves as a kind of control center or headquarters. Instead, there appear
to be different portions of the brain that engage in parallel processing and
that may have a larger or smaller role in causing particular behaviors at a
given time. One useful way to think of the brain is as containing different
“modules.”114 Robert Wright provides a particularly accessible explanation
of how to understand this idea. The notion is that different parts of the brain
have evolved through natural selection—and chance—to perform different
functions, and depending on the circumstances different modules may be in
ascendancy at particular times.115 Wright usefully cautions us not to think of
modules as discrete.116 They are not separate units, sealed off from one
another. With that caution in mind, the analogy is helpful. In a sense, it
suggests that we are all a bit like people who suffer from DID. Different parts
of our brain compete for control, and which one prevails at a given moment
may dictate what we think, believe, and do. And there is no dominant,
overarching self that selects among the competing modules.

112. I do not mean to imply any direct correlation between the brain science I discuss in
this Section and DID. There may or may not be one, but I mean to take no position on that
issue.
113. DENNETT, supra note 76, at 107.
114. ROBERT WRIGHT, WHY BUDDHISM IS TRUE: THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
ENLIGHTENMENT 94 (2017).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Whatever the merits of a third-person, “modular” view of brain
functioning—it is unsurprisingly controversial117—it seems to have limited
utility from the first-person perspective, at least in a strong form. If there is
no unified self—no Cartesian Theatre—from which we can view the
different modules, but rather only a series of different times at which
particular modules dominate, what can we do with that information? It seems
to hold (potentially) great descriptive and predictive value, but does not offer
any obvious route for improving our experience or our decision-making. And
it is so foreign from our first-person perspective that there is no clear way to
synthesize the two.118 The modular theory denies the existence of a unified
self capable of undergoing experiences, contemplating options, and initiating
actions. So what self could act on the knowledge of modularity?119
Wright, in his thoughtful and provocative book on cognitive science and
Buddhism, acknowledges this issue. Some traditional understandings of
Buddhist doctrine, much like some modern scientific understandings, deny
the existence of any self at all. Yet Wright is committed to incorporating
insights from both Buddhism and science in a practical prescription for how
to improve how we think and live. His proposal is that we use meditation to
obtain a certain level of remove from our own senses, emotions, thoughts,
and beliefs. From this perspective, we may be able, as it were, to watch our
modules in action—and to view what they cause us to experience, feel, think,
and believe from a critical distance. That separation, according to Wright,
may allow us to make calm, informed, and deliberate judgments about who
we want to be and what we want to do. We gain some control over ourselves.
Note that Wright’s description of how the mind works and his prescription
for how we might respond to that information do hold great potential value
from the first-person perspective. He suggests a way for us to gain greater
mastery over ourselves and to exercise our wills in ways that may not come
naturally to us. But, as he recognizes, there is a difficulty in reconciling his

117. Compare JEROME H. BARKOW ET AL., THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE (1992) and JEFF CLUNE ET AL., THE
EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MODULARITY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, Mar. 2013
(arguing for a modular theory), with Jaak Panksepp & Jules B. Panksepp, The Seven Sins of
Evolutionary Psychology, 6 EVOLUTION AND COGNITION 108, 108-09 (2000) (questioning the
modular theory).
118. See SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION, supra note 4, at 200-06.
119. It is interesting to consider how the modular theory can account for knowledge about
the modular theory. How can a person know his or her own brain is modular? Presumably one
or more modules contain this knowledge and use it as part of the ongoing struggle among the
modules for supremacy.
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argument with the notion that there is no self.120 To act as Wright suggests,
we seem to have to accept the idea of a Cartesian Theatre or something
similar to it. Otherwise, who is it that, after the benefits of meditation, is able
to make better choices and to exercise more control?
Again, two propositions seem to be true: the third-person, scientific
perspective in its pure form seems incompatible with—and unhelpful for—
first-person decision-making; and yet some of the insights we gain from
science may be helpful to that decision-making, if appropriately adapted.
2. The Singular Self over Time
In addition to casting doubt on the existence of a single self at a given
time, the scientific perspective casts doubt on the persistence of the self over
time. In other words, the person I am right now and the person I am in a
minute (or a moment) from now may be in a profound sense disconnected,
despite our intuitive sense of our own continuing existence. From the firstperson perspective, this notion seems preposterous. From the third-person
perspective, it is surprisingly hard to resist. But even if true, the surprising—
even startling—idea that we in effect die in every moment seems difficult to
integrate in a useful way into the first-person perspective.
Consider the concept of whole brain emulation (WBE), also known as
mind uploading or brain uploading. A startup already exists, Nectome, that

120. WRIGHT, supra note 114, at 64. Wright recognizes this paradox, although he does not
necessarily take the position, suggested above, that a self must exist to render his prescription
viable. A similar difficulty—a potential internal inconsistency—besets Susan Blackstone’s
attempt to reconcile her view that there is no self in the ordinary sense with how human beings
see the world. She concludes her fascinating short book summarizing issues that arise about
consciousness as follows:
My hope is that one day our scientific understanding of consciousness will come
together with personal insight. There are already some scientists with deep
personal practice, and practitioners who study the science, holding out the hope
that first- and third-person perspectives will eventually come together and let us
see clearly. Both intellectually and in our own experience we should be able to
stop being deluded and see through all those illusions of self, free will, and
consciousness.
SUSAN BLACKMORE, CONSCIOUSNESS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 133-34 (2d ed. 2017).
What Blackmore does not explain—if self, free will, and consciousness are illusions—is who
the “we” is that will gain this clarity, how we can choose to pursue it, and how we can stop
being deluded—or how we can ever be deluded in the first place—if consciousness is an
illusion.
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plans to offer this service to terminal patients.121 It offers people the prospect
of achieving immortality by uploading their minds to a computer. Assume
for the moment this is possible. Assume that technology advances such that
a computer can replicate biological existence. People may be able to see,
smell, feel (in the physical and emotional senses of that word), think, believe,
etc., much as they did when they had an organic form, or at least close enough
that their existence in computer form could feel, from their new perspective,
continuous with their past existence. Not just their capacity to process current
experiences, but also their memories, are uploaded and stored, so that the
computer versions of people may feel that they are the very same people
living a continuous life with their former carbon-based selves. Assume that
the computer versions can last forever through replacement of hardware over
time. Will they have achieved immortality?
You might think they will not have. When their human form dies, they
may have died, and they may have merely created immortal replicas of
themselves. That seems most consistent with our first-person perspective.
Assume, for example, that someone’s human self survives the uploading
intact. The organic version and the computer version co-exist for some
period. The two may even interact. In our ordinary understanding of these
matters, we would say that the organic form remains who a person is and that
the computer form is someone else (assuming it is a person at all). The actual
organic person would likely perceive the computer facsimile as a separate
entity, like a twin, only far closer to identical in certain ways than even an
identical sibling.
This issue is not new to philosophy, although the particular application—
uploading a mind to a computer—is relatively novel as a feasible possibility,
if it is one. Philosophers have long asked what, if anything, about the self
endures over time. Consider a hypothetical famously discussed by Derek
Parfit, among others. Parfit asked us to imagine that it becomes possible to
transport someone to a distant location through a scanning process, perfectly
reconstructing the person on a lunar colony and then destroying the original
version.122 Assuming that the memories of the original version of the person
are included in the new version—presumably memories exist in some
physical form within us—the reconstructed person experiences no
discontinuity, other than a sudden change of location. Would you step into
the scanner? If you did, would you survive the trip?
121. Antonio Regalado, A Startup Is Pitching a Mind-Uploading Service That Is “100
Percent Fatal,” MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
610456/a-startup-is-pitching-a-mind-uploading-service-that-is-100-percent-fatal/.
122. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 199 (1987).
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Parfit puts a finer point on the problem by proposing a variation: the
original version of you is not destroyed at the time of the scanning. You
survive in your original form. So two versions of you exist, one far away (this
time on Mars) and one on Earth. But the scanning has caused a problem for
the Earth version of you. It will die within a few days.123 Do you, as the Earth
version, take any comfort from the continued existence of a version of you
on Mars? More precisely, when your Earth version dies will you continue to
exist? You may not. You may well feel as much panic about dying
imminently as you would if you had not been scanned. It is well and good
for the replica of you that it will continue to exist, you might think, but that
does not do the real you any good at all.
What is intriguing—and potentially upsetting—is how hard it is to resist
the view from a scientific, materialist perspective that our ordinary lives are
in key respects just like the person who is uploaded to a computer and then
dies or the person who is scanned and destroyed. The reason is that from the
scientific view it is hard to account for any persistent self at all. To be sure,
science can explain our sense of continued existence. The human mind is
configured in such a way that it believes in and highly values its persistent
existence. That is highly adaptive from the perspective of evolution.
Creatures who understand themselves as persisting as a self over time and
who prize their continued existence—likely above almost all else—are likely
to survive long enough to procreate. But from a scientific perspective, the
most plausible account of our sense of an enduring self is just a delusion. We
have only present experiences—pains, pleasures, etc.—combined with
memories of past experiences—also presently experienced—and a
psychology built to think of ourselves as enduring over time. But two entities
that have the same—or equivalent—present experiences and memories and
psychologies would from a purely scientific, third-person perspective seem
to have equal claim to be the same self.124
To get at least some sense of the strength of this position from the
scientific, third-person perspective, imagine that the scanning works as
follows. You enter a dark box and are perfectly duplicated. Two organic
versions of you emerge. No one knows—not even you or the duplicate of you
(if the other version is the duplicate)—which one of you is the original. You
both have the very same memories, including the memory of entering the box
and exiting it. You both have the very same psychologies. You have
equivalent—if ever so slightly different—experiences of leaving the box.
123. Id. at 199-200.
124. See SIMON BLACKBURN, THINK 120-48 (1999).
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Assume even the age of the physical materials that constitute your forms are
indistinguishable, such that science cannot tell which one of you was scanned
and which one created from the scanning process. The new version of you
would feel the very same sense of the persistent existence of the self as the
original version.
This scientific view of how the self endures over time—or does not endure
over time—is known as the bundle theory. The label dates back to Hume,
who wrote that he could identify no persistent self over time, just a bundle of
experiences.125 The most powerful counterarguments to the bundle theory
tend to rely on concepts that are generally considered foreign to the scientific
account, such as the notion of a spirit or a soul. If a spirit or soul does exist,
then presumably it remains in the original version of you and not the replica
produced through the scanning process. But if there is no spirit or soul or any
equivalent, it is hard to say why the original you has any stronger claim to be
you than the copy does.
Incorporating the bundle theory into the first-person perspective could
lead to some profound shifts in how we see the world and behave. The
consequences would seem to be great if we were to treat our future selves in
significant ways as not really the same as our current selves—as people might
think of a scanned or computer replica of themselves out there in the world.
It would seem to imply, for example, that the future pains or pleasures that I
will experience are not really going to be experienced by me any more than
the pains or pleasures of a replica or, for that matter, someone completely
unrelated to me. That might incline us toward the utilitarian view—which
many people find counterintuitive—that we should treat everyone’s pain and
pleasure equally and not privilege our own experiences over those of others.
Perhaps the utilitarians are right because we are not the same person from
moment to moment. Perhaps teenagers are too when they act recklessly—not
because they are immortal, as they seem to think, but because we are all
perfectly mortal, dying in each instant with only in effect an unconnected
replica existing in the next one. This notion brings new salience to the myth
of the phoenix rising from its ashes. And perhaps Robert Wright should have
included in his discussion of the connections between Buddhism and modern
science an exploration of the idea that all that exists is the present.
Unlike the idea of psychological modules, however, most of the
implications of the bundle theory for decision-making are not obvious. On
125. See BLACKMORE & TROSCIANKO, supra note 109, at 437-38 (citing PARFIT, supra note
122). Some strands of Buddhism have long held that there is no persistent self over time. Id.
at 436. One can understand this doctrine as having important similarities to Hume’s view. Id.
at 436-38.
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one hand, the notion that we are perpetually and persistently dying would
seem to be profoundly disruptive for our first-person perspective. If we were
to accept this proposition, it would seem we move through the world in a
manner very different than the way we currently do. On the other hand, it is
not clear how it would change the way we see the world and make decisions.
D. Summary: Science and the First-Person Perspective
The above analysis is meant to be suggestive. It explores reasons to believe
that science is not currently capable—and may not ever be capable—of
providing a complete account of subjective experience. To the extent
computers operate in the realm of science—to the extent that they are able to
process information only in ways that science can explain—they may not be
able to attain subjective experience. If subjective experience in turn is
necessary to make moral judgments, computers may be limited to the realm
of fact and unable to operate in the realm of morality. If legal practice and
judicial practice involve moral judgments—as Part I contended—AI may be
capable of playing only a limited role in the law.
Conclusion
The above analysis suggests a potential limit on AI in legal practice. It
may be that AI is limited to the realm of science, that science cannot fully
capture the first-person perspective, that the first-person perspective is
necessary to make moral judgments, and that legal and judicial practitioners
sometimes must make moral judgments. If all of that proves true, we may
have identified a bulwark against AI taking over all aspects of our legal
system.
To some of us, that is good news. It leaves room for human beings in the
law for the indefinite future. It also provides a reason for legal practitioners—
judges and lawyers alike—to acknowledge the role that moral and other value
judgments play in legal practice. Many of us believe that participants in the
legal process are not as transparent as they should be about how moral
judgments inform the work they do.
To be sure, the above analysis does not address many practical
implications of AI. Consider economics. Despite AI’s limitations, it may
nonetheless hold the potential to do a great deal of our legal work for us—
even if people nevertheless continue to play some role on the bench and in
the bar. Growth of AI in the law could be both good and bad. On one hand,
if AI can improve access to legal justice, and make the legal system more
affordable, that may well be desirable. Of course, the result may be more
competition in the law, rendering legal practice less lucrative. But the
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monopoly lawyers have on legal practice is meant to protect clients, not the
financial well-being of attorneys. More generally, an animating principle of
our antitrust laws is that they protect competition, not competitors. That
principle would seem to apply to lawyers as well. To the extent we retain as
a primary goal that competition should be allowed to flourish to the benefit
of consumers, we may conclude that an expanded role for AI in law would
be positive.
But our economic philosophy may need to change with technological
advancements. AI threatens a disruption to our economic system as
fundamental as any we have seen. If the day comes when machines can do
almost all of the work we need to do, it is possible that those who control
capital—who own the machines—will be able to reap the vast majority of
the gains. The great masses may find themselves with very limited means to
contribute to the economic system and thereby to earn a living. Never mind
the special plight of attorneys. That may be lost as much of humanity flails.
We may need a radical revision to how we allocate the spoils of that brave
new world. Any philosophical limitations on the capacity of AI to engage in
legal practice could well prove inadequate to ensure a reasonably just
economic order.
This Essay does not address the looming economic and other issues that
AI raises. Its scope is much more modest. It seeks merely to identify a
possible limit to the role that AI can play in law (and perhaps related
professions). In exploring that possible limit, it suggests that AI may advance
so much that people are left with no meaningful role to perform in the
scientific world—as physicists, chemists, or biologists. The same may be true
for the technical tasks performed by doctors, architects, and the like. But
people still may retain the unique ability to make moral judgments (and
perhaps other value judgments). If so, this Essay suggests we may find
ourselves in a strange new society. Imagine a young woman contemplating
her major in college. She may have a passion for engineering, but she may
nonetheless choose to study moral philosophy. After all, she may think, it is
important to be practical, and moral philosophy is where all the remaining
jobs are.
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